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Abstract 
 
In this paper, an index of domestic macroprudential policy tools is constructed and the 
effectiveness of these tools in controlling credit growth is studied using a dynamic panel data 
model for the period between 2000 and 2017. The empirical analysis includes two panels 
namely an EU panel of 27 countries and a Latin American panel of 7 countries, and the paper 
also looks at a case study of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK. Our main results 
find that the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools does not have a statistically 
significant impact on credit growth when considering a panel of 27 EU countries. When 
considering the case of Japan, a tighter capital conservation buffer leads to a decrease in the 
credit supply. When looking at a panel of 7 Latin American countries, our main results show 
that a tightening of the capital conservation buffer results in an increase in the credit supply. A 
tightening of the loan-to-value ratio results in a decrease in the credit supply in the panel of 7 
Latin American countries. Lastly, a tightening in the overall macroprudential policy tool stance 
results in a decrease in credit supply in Japan and an increase in credit supply in Portugal. 
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1. Introduction 
The deregulation of the US financial system in the time leading up to the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) and the subsequent growth of the ‘Shadow Banking’ system resulted in the spurred use 
of complex derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) as well as the rapid growth of both the US housing market and the market for subprime 
mortgages. When extremely high home prices were no longer supported, prices plummeted and 
a severe credit freeze ensued in both the US and in the global economy. European banks had 
substantial balance sheet exposures to the US housing market and both public and private debt 
in many European countries skyrocketed, Latin American commodity exporting countries were 
affected by the weaker US dollar and the drop in external demand severely impacted the 
Japanese economy. The unexpected interconnectedness, vulnerabilities and the general 
contagion that encompassed the GFC confirmed the idea that an alternative policy framework 
needed to be implemented by Central Banks in an effort to manage financial instability and the 
ideal solution was the implementation of a comprehensive macroprudential policy framework.   
 
Crockett (2000), FSB/IMF/BIS (2011) and IMF (2013) state that macroprudential policy is the 
use of prudential tools in an effort to limit systematic risk and although macroprudential policy 
tools were included in the policy frameworks of emerging economies well before the crisis, 
macroprudential policy use is now broader as the crisis experience prompted its inclusion in 
policy frameworks. In 2017, Vítor Constâncio3 said that “macroprudential policy emerged from 
the crisis as a new tool to deal with systemic risk in the financial sector.  
 
Recognition that micro-supervision of individual institutions was not sufficient to ensure 
financial stability led to the emergence of a new policy area. A new authority was needed to be 
accountable and responsible for monitoring and preventing the build-up of endogenous 
systemic risk in the financial sector.”  Galati and Moessner (2011) identify two main ingredients 
for the implementation of a successful macroprudential policy framework.  Firstly, the financial 
system “must be robust to external shocks” (Allen and Wood, 2006) and secondly, the financial 
system must be “resilient to shocks originating within the financial system” (Houben et. al., 
2004). 
 
                                                
3 Vice-President of the ECB between June 2010 and May 2018. 
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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the impact of macroprudential policy on 
financial stability for both an EU panel of 27 countries and a Latin American panel of 7 
countries. A case study is also considered focusing on Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the 
UK. An index of domestic macroprudential policy tools is constructed and the effectiveness of 
these tools in controlling credit growth is studied using a dynamic panel data model for the 
period between 2000 and 2017. A monthly index, iMaPP database constructed by Alam et al. 
(2019), of macroprudential policy tools implemented in the relevant countries is used as a 
starting point.  This index is coded through 2016:Q4, and is then cross checked using the Cerutti 
et al. (2017) index and extended using both the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey and the IMF 
Macroprudential Data Query report. The monthly index is cumulated to create the quarterly 
database used in this paper.   
 
Our main results show that the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools does not have 
a statistically significant impact on credit growth when considering a panel of 27 EU countries, 
this result is in line with earlier literature that finds that the impact of macroprudential policy 
tool implementation is less significant when considering developed, open economies (Cerutti 
et al., 2017). When considering the case of Japan, a tighter capital conservation buffer leads to 
a decrease in the credit supply. A negative coefficient on the interaction term between credit 
growth and the macroprudential policy choice index implies that an inverse relationship exists 
between the growth in credit and the level of the macroprudential policy choice index. In these 
cases, the macroprudential policy stance should be tightened in times of financial instability in 
an effort to curb credit growth and hence, to stabilise credit supply. When looking at a panel of 
7 Latin American countries, our main results show that a tightening of the capital conservation 
buffer results in an increase in the credit supply. A tightening of the loan-to-value ratio results 
in a decrease in the credit supply in the panel of 7 Latin American countries. The success of 
caps on loan-to-value ratios (LTV) is in line with previous literature, most recently Gambacorta 
and Murcia (2019) show that macroprudential policy tools aimed at controlling credit cycles 
are found to be effective at reducing credit growth, Claessens et al. (2013) find that debt-
service-to-income ratio (DSTI) caps and LTV caps more effectively manage asset growth than 
capital requirements.  Lastly, a tightening in the overall macroprudential policy tool stance 
results in a decrease in credit supply in Japan and an increase in credit supply in Portugal. 
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The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 surveys existing literature; Section 3 discusses the 
methodology and the data used; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The widespread use of macroprudential policy tools emerged in the aftermath of the GFC when 
Central Bankers and policy makers realised that a policy framework with a focus on 
constraining systematic risk was needed. Allen and Gale (2007), Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) point out that systematic crises usually occur after periods 
of rapid and strong credit growth instead of being random, exogenously caused events. Borio 
(2003) points out that an important difference between a microprudentialist and a 
macroprudentialist is that a microprudentialist deems it sufficient to maintain the stability of 
individual institutions to ensure the stability of the entire financial system while a 
macroprudentialist would challenge this. The Committee on Global Financial System (2010) 
states that macroprudential policy “complements the micro-prudential focus on safety and 
soundness of individual institutions” and Caruana (2010) states that the aim of macroprudential 
policy is “to reduce systemic risk by explicitly addressing the interconnections between 
financial institutions and their common exposures and the pro-cyclicality of the financial 
system”.   
 
Lim et al. (2011) study the role of macroprudential policy instruments in the reduction of 
systematic risk in 49 countries between 2000 and 2010 using a dynamic panel data model. They 
find that reserve requirements are indeed effective in reducing the procyclical behaviour of 
credit growth.  Kuttner and Shim (2013) find that both the level of housing prices and the level 
of credit were effectively lowered after the implementation of macroprudential policy tools in 
57 countries between 1980 and 2011. Borio and Drehman (2009) and IMF (2014) note that 
rising home prices combined with increases in credit supply (mortgage) may signal a 
procyclical build-up of risks in housing market. The role of the housing market in the GFC has 
made it pertinent to study the impact of macroprudential policy implementation on both credit 
growth and housing prices. Ahuja and Nabar (2011) find that caps on loan-to-value ratios had 
a decelerating effect on property price growth, specifically in Hong Kong, between 2000 and 
2010. Ahmed and Zlate (2013) focus on both the pre and post-crisis periods and by considering 
capital flows to emerging markets, they find that capital controls implemented in these countries 
were able to manage capital flows.   
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Vandenbussche et al. (2012) find that higher capital ratios and marginal reserve requirements 
on foreign funding effectively abate increases in house prices when considering central, eastern 
and south-eastern Europe between the late 1990s and 2010. The Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (2011) also finds that loan-to-value caps have indeed been effective at reducing 
systematic risk in the housing market in Hong Kong, Kim (2014) comes to the same conclusion 
when looking at the implementation of loan-to-value and debt-to-income caps in Korea. Kim 
(2014) finds that Korean loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratios were successful at 
reducing mortgage credit supply however, these tools are accompanied by unintended side 
effects. 
 
Cerutti et al.  (2017) use a new database to study the impact of five types of prudential policy 
tools.  The IBRN Prudential Instruments Database includes quarterly changes for 64 countries 
over the period between 2000 and 2014. The index includes changes in capital buffers, 
concentration limits, interbank exposures, loan-to-value ratios and reserve requirements on both 
foreign and domestic currency. The authors find that loan-to-value ratios experience changes 
in policy most frequently, loan-to-value ratios and reserve requirements also exhibit salient 
countercyclical properties in line with policy objectives. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015) 
analyse the impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation on the real domestic credit 
growth rate while controlling for the level of the VIX index. They find that targeted 
macroprudential policy tools are indeed effective at managing real domestic credit growth in 
57 emerging and advanced economies. Agénor et al. (2012) make use of a DSGE model to 
show that macroprudential policy in a small open economy may help with the policy tensions 
attached to shifts in capital flows. Tovar et al. (2012) use dynamic panel VARs to analyse the 
impact that reserve requirements have on real private bank credit growth and find that in the 
Latin American countries considered, there is a modest slowing in credit growth following 
policy implementation and there is a complementary relationship between conventional 
monetary policy tools and reserve requirements. Federico et al. (2012) also look at Latin 
American countries using a VAR analysis to study the effects of changes in legal reserve 
requirements on the macroeconomy and Baba and Kokenyne (2011) perform a qualitative 
assessment of the impact of capital controls in emerging markets. They find that capital controls 
that do not cover the majority of inflows may not have the macroeconomic impact that is 
expected even if they are successful at reducing targeted flows. 
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Lopez and Bruni (2019) note that the macroprudential policy framework implemented needs to 
be “an adaptable and flexible global network” and they define both the objectives and levels of 
impact of each of the different policy frameworks implemented by Central Banks and policy 
makers (see Table 1). Peydró (2016) points out that financial crises are often followed by credit 
crunches, the same is noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) who note that long-lasting 
recessions with falling aggregate welfare and employment are often preceded by financial 
crises.  Jiménez et al. (2015) analyses the impact of dynamic provisioning and countercyclical 
bank capital buffers on credit supply cycles in Spain. The authors find that countercyclical bank 
capital buffers have a mitigating effect on credit supply however, the impact of dynamic 
provisioning is not significant as any reduction in credit availability disappears after three 
quarters. Gupta et al. (2009) find that countercyclical macroprudential policy tools are able to 
shorten the duration of crises. Claessens (2017) notes that globalisation has resulted in a reduced 
ability to control domestic finance and the author shows that macroprudential policy tool 
implementation is less effective in developed markets. 
 
Table 1 - Objectives and Impact of Policy Frameworks 
 
Source: Lopez and Bruni (2019). 
 
Cerutti et al. (2017) make use of a manually coded index of the macroprudential instruments 
implemented in 85 countries between 1990 and 2015. The authors find that a tighter 
macroprudential policy stance reduces household credit supplied by banks which are more 
dependent on foreign sources of funding, the results are even more pronounced for foreign 
currency denominated credit. Cerutti et al. (2017) also find that credit growth in higher risk 
foreign currencies in periods of low risk aversion hence, a low level of the VIX index, as well 
as periods of low foreign policy rates is more effectively controlled by macroprudential policy.   
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Angelini et al. (2012) note that “Macroprudential policy should be concerned with the setting 
of the structural features of the financial system, with a view to limiting risk, reducing 
procyclicality and increasing resilience by building up adequate buffers in good times for use 
in bad times. Only if these structural parameters are properly set will there be room left for 
discretionary and countercyclical macroprudential policy”. Montoro and Moreno (2010) 
consider the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Brazil and find that macroprudential policy plays a 
supporting role for monetary policy as policy dilemmas involving capital flows, the 
transmission mechanism of conventional monetary policy and lastly credit growth management 
are dealt with. Bruno et al. (2014) look at 12 Asia-Pacific countries and find that policies 
targeting the banking sector and bond market capital flows effectively manage bank inflows 
and bond inflows respectively. The authors also find that, in some cases, macroprudential policy 
implementation may be more successful when policies are implemented in such a way that they 
complement tighter monetary policy instead of competing policy frameworks being 
implemented.  Agur and Demertzis (2015) find that monetary policy still has the ability to affect 
financial stability in the presence of macroprudential policy tools. 
 
Macroprudential policy is implemented in an effort to target two dimensions namely, the ‘time 
dimension’ and the ‘cross-sectional dimension’4  Zhang and Zoli (2014) show that a number of 
capital flow measures implemented in 46 countries were effective in managing house price 
growth, credit growth, bank leverage and equity flows. More specifically, taxes on housing, 
foreign currency related measured and loan-to-value ratios were most effective. Crowe et al. 
(2011) and Cerutti et al. (2015) also find that loan-to-value ratios and similar measures have 
the greatest potential to manage real estate booms. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) find that 
macroprudential policy tool implementation has both the ability to mitigate credit booms as 
well as the ability to reduce the likelihood of booms leading to financial catastrophes. Dumičić 
(2018) look at macroprudential policy tool implementation in Central and Eastern European 
countries, the authors find that macroprudential policy tool implementation was more effective 
at decreasing credit availability to households than credit to the non-financial corporate sector.  
The authors also show that macroprudential policy tools are an effective measure for the 
alleviation of systematic crises. Lastly, Habermeier et al. (2011) show that macroprudential 
policy tools effectively manage capital inflows and reduce credit growth in some cases 
however, are unable to manage price inflation of assets. 
                                                
4Vulnerabilities associated with the build-up of risks over time and vulnerabilities associated with the 
interconnectedness of the financial system respectively.  
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Methodology 
An index of domestic macroprudential policy tools is constructed and the effectiveness of these 
tools in controlling credit growth is studied using a dynamic panel data model. A dummy 
variable with value +1 is assigned in the presence of a tightening of macroprudential policy, -1 
is assigned when macroprudential policy is loosened and 0 is assigned when there is no change 
to the macroprudential stance. A cumulative index of the macroprudential policy stance is also 
included. When two or three macroprudential policy tools are implemented or tightened, the 
cumulative index takes a corresponding value of +2 or +3.  In the case where a number of policy 
tools are loosened, the cumulative index takes a corresponding value of -2 or -3.  The impact 
of macroprudential policy implementation on credit growth is measured while controlling for 
the business cycle, the level of global risk aversion and interest rate changes. 
 
The regression equations are as follows:  
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑"  + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β3iit-1 + β4VIXit-1 
+ β6Macrorudential_Indexit-1 + β7yit-1 + 𝜀"$, (1) 
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑"  + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β2Credit_Growth_Macroprudential_Indexit-1 
+β3iit-1 + β4VIXit-1 + β5VIX_Macroprudential_Indexit-1 + β6Macrorudential_Indexit-1  
+ β7yit-1 + β8y_Macrorudential_Indexit-1 + 𝜀"$, (2) 
 
where, Credit_Growtht is the quarterly year-on-year growth in the level of credit, VIXt is the 
quarterly year-on-year growth in the level of the VIX index, it is the quarterly year-on-year 
growth in the interest rate, Macrorudential_Indexit is the value of the macroprudential policy 
index, yit is the quarterly year-on-year GDP growth rate, 𝜑i are country fixed effects to account 
for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and 𝜀it is a disturbance term satisfying standard 
conditions of zero mean and constant variance.  
 
Four panel unit root tests are run to test for the presence of panel unit roots in both the panels 
as well as the individual country cases. Firstly, three first-generation panel unit root tests 
(Maddala and Wu test, the Fisher-Type Phillips-Perron test and the Fisher-Type Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test) are included which assume that cross sectional units are independent while 
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the second-generation panel unit root test (Pesaran test) allows for cross sectional dependence.  
The first-generation Maddala and Wu test (Table B1 in Appendix B) tests for the presence of 
panel unit roots, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of panel unit roots when considering 
the lagged interest rate growth for Chile, lagged GDP growth for Colombia and lagged credit 
growth for Portugal. The null hypothesis of all panels containing unit roots is rejected for both 
the Latin American panel as well as the EU panel. The first-generation Fisher-Type test 
(Phillips-Perron test, Table B2 in Appendix B) tests for the presence of a unit root and shows 
that we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables in both the Latin American 
panel and the EU panel. We also reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables in all 
five country cases with the exception of the lagged GDP growth for Chile and Portugal and the 
lagged interest rate growth for the UK and Portugal. The first-generation Fisher-Type unit root 
tests therefore show that the lagged first-differenced variables have an order of integration of 
I(0) implying that, the lagged first differenced variables are stationary for the majority of cases 
with the exception of the lagged first differenced interest rate for the cases of Portugal and the 
UK. Although, the Phillips-Perron test for the presence of a unit root indicates that four of the 
series contain a unit root, when considering the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, this result 
changes. The results of the ADF test indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
in all cases and hence, none of the series contain a unit root. The Phillips-Perron test corrects 
for the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors and it is shown that the 
second regression equation does indeed suffer from serial correlation for the case of Portugal, 
in this case, the use of the unit root test that specifically corrects for serial correlation is the 
most appropriate.   
 
One should proceed with caution when analysing the results of unit root tests with small, finite 
samples as the results of both the Phillips-Perron unit root test as well as the results of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test may be severely size distorted.  These unit root tests may not 
have the ability to distinguish between persistent stationary processes and nonstationary 
processes although, our test regressions exclude trends and instead, only include a constant term 
which may improve the reliability of the above tests.   
 
The second-generation Pesaran test (Table B3 in Appendix B) tests for the presence of panel 
unit roots allowing for cross sectional dependence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of all 
panels containing unit roots when considering the lagged growth in VIX for both the Latin 
American panel as well as the EU panel.   
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The problem of endogeneity may also present itself in the analysis as one may assume that the 
macroprudential policy stance of Central Banks and hence, the macroprudential policy tool 
index studied in this paper may be subject to some cross-correlation between the index and the 
error term or a reverse causality.  A reverse causality is evident in many empirical analyses 
dealing with financial development, output growth and financial stability with an example 
being the relationship between banking sector development and output growth as discussed by 
Peia and Roszbach (2015), a reverse causality between inequality and financial development is 
also discussed by Bazillier and Hericourt (2016).   
 
Therefore, in this paper, a reverse causality may exist between the macroprudential policy tool 
index and the level of credit growth. It is highly likely that the level of credit growth would 
influence the macroprudential policy stance of policy makers and Central Banks as the 
macroprudential policy stance is directly related to the policy makers’ view of the financial 
stability (as proxied by credit growth in this paper) of the system at any given point in time.  
The macroprudential policy tool index is indeed cointegrated with the level of credit growth 
and a post-regression estimation test indicates that granger causality does indeed exist between 
the two variables.  In Nier et al. (2012), it is proposed that lagged variables should be included 
in the empirical analysis in an effort to mitigate the endogeneity problem and the lagged 
regression results should then be compared with those of the unlagged variables in an effort to 
identify any issues caused by the relationship between the potentially affected variable and the 
error term.  Further work could be conducted in an effort to identify a measure of financial 
stability that does not exhibit a reverse causality with the macroprudential policy tool index 
however, the chance of identifying such a variable is slim. 
 
Endogeneity may lead to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates and the issue of 
endogeneity usually presents itself because of a reverse causality between the dependent and 
independent variables.  Endogeneity is also more likely to be an issue when considering macro 
analyses (in comparison to micro analyses) as it is more difficult to isolate the individual effects 
of the observable variables.  To account for endogeneity in the model, one would need to 
include an IV estimator that is correlated with the endogenous variable however, uncorrelated 
with the error term.  It is unlikely that one would find a variable that meets these requirements 
when focusing on the macroprudential policy tool index. Hence, the macroprudential policy 
tool index is lagged by one period which should mitigate the effect of endogeneity as discussed 
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in Nier et al. (2012).  To err on the side of caution and in line with Nier et al. (2012), the 
estimated coefficients are interpreted based on significance and sign instead of the value 
thereof.  Bruno and Shin (2013) lag all quarterly variables in the analysis by one quarter in an 
effort to mitigate endogeneity issues that may present themselves and in this paper, all variables 
are also lagged by one quarter.  The lagging of all of the explanatory variables should mitigate 
any other endogeneity issues that may arise in the analysis. 
 
To add to the robustness of this paper, an additional regression is run (Table C1 in Appendix 
C) that includes an IV estimator.  Regulatory quality, which “reflects perceptions of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2010), is included as an IV estimator to account 
for any endogeneity in the model caused by the potentially endogenous variable, the 
macroprudential policy tool index.  Regulatory quality is chosen as an appropriate IV estimator 
due to the likely correlation with the macroprudential policy tool index as the quality of 
regulation undoubtedly has an influence on the level of macroprudential policy intervention.  
Regulatory quality is unlikely to directly impact credit growth and instead, impacts credit 
growth through the macroprudential policy tool index while being uncorrelated with the error 
term. 
 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (Table B4 in Appendix B) in panel data shows that 
both the Latin American panel as well as the EU panel do indeed suffer from serial correlation, 
the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity (Table B5 in Appendix B) shows that both panels 
also suffer from the presence of heteroskedasticity, the main results (Table 3 to Table 7) 
therefore include regression results with corrections for both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.  The sum of macroprudential policy choices is the relevant variable for the 
statistical tests however, the results hold for capital conservation buffers, countercyclical capital 
buffers, loan-to-value ratios as well as reserve requirements.  The Modified Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity is not an issue in the individual country cases, the Durbin-Watson test for 
autocorrelation shows (Table B4 in Appendix B) that there is no first order correlation for the 
case of Colombia for all macroprudential policy choices analysed as well as the sum of 
macroprudential policy choices.   
 
There is no serial correlation present for the case of the UK for all cases except when 
considering loan-to-value ratios for both regression equation 1 and 2 and reserve requirements 
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for the second regression equation.  For the Chilean case, the result of the Durbin-Watson test 
is inconclusive due to the test statistic falling between the lower and upper bound for all cases 
except the loan-to-value ratio for the first equation.  For the Portuguese case, the result is 
inconclusive when considering reserve requirements for both regression equations and the 
second regression equation when considering the sum of macroprudential policy choices.  
Lastly, for the Japanese case, the result is inconclusive for all cases as the test statistic falls 
between the lower and upper bounds of the Durbin-Watson test in all cases.  The final results 
for the country cases therefore include corrections for serial correlation when considering 
reserve requirements (both equation 1 and 2) as well as the sum of macroprudential policy 
choices (regression equation 2) for Portugal.  The correction for serial correlation is included 
when considering loan-to-value ratios (both equation 1 and 2) and reserve requirements 
(regression equation 2) for the UK.  The correction is included for all cases for Japan and for 
all cases except the first regression equation when considering loan-to-value ratios for Chile.  
In the remaining cases, notably all regressions for Colombia, no serial correlation is present and 
hence, standard fixed effects regression results are included. 
 
3.2. Data 
Allen and Gale (2007), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and 
Borio (2018) note that credit growth is often a precursor of financial crises.  Credit growth is 
thus included as a proxy for financial stability.  A monthly index, iMaPP database constructed 
by Alam et al. (2019), of macroprudential policy tools implemented in the relevant countries is 
used as a starting point.  This index is coded through 2016:Q4, this index is then cross checked 
using the Cerutti et al. (2017) index and extended using the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey.  
The extension through 2017:Q4 is cross checked using the IMF Macroprudential Data Query 
Report.  The 2017 IMF survey is used as the deciding source and hence, when policy choices 
are reflected in the Data Query Report but not in the 2017 IMF Survey, these policy choices are 
not included.  The monthly iMaPP index is cumulated to create the quarterly database used in 
this paper.  The impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation on credit growth is 
studied for the period 2000:Q1 to 2017:Q4. The relevant countries are identified in Table 2. 
 
The relevant variables are as follows: 
• Credit growth as a proxy for financial stability (BIS total credit statistics and IMF); 
• The growth in the level of the VIX index is included as a proxy for the level of global 
risk aversion (Federal Reserve Economic Data); 
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• The GDP growth is included as a proxy for the business cycle (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data and OECD Stats); 
• The interest rate growth is included as a proxy for the cost of borrowing (World 
Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of 
Argentina); 
Table 2 - Countries Included in the Analysis 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in 27 
European countries between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4 while Figure 2 shows the cumulative index 
of macroprudential policy tools implemented in 7 Latin American countries between 2000:Q1 
and 2017:Q4.  The graphs below show that the number of instances where macroprudential 
policy tools were implemented or the stance was tightened increased between 2000:Q1 and 
2017:Q4 in the European panel, in the case of the Latin American panel, it is evident that the 
number of instances where macroprudential policy tools were either implemented or tightened 
increased in the time around the GFC.  The macroprudential stance of Latin American countries 
became more active in the time around the GFC. 
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Figure 1 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in 27 
European Countries 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 2 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in 7 Latin 
American Countries 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in Chile 
between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4, Figure 4 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy 
tools implemented in Colombia between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4 and Figure 5 shows the 
cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in Japan between 2000:Q1 and 
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2017:Q4.  Figure 6 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented 
in Portugal between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4 while Figure 7 shows the cumulative index of 
macroprudential policy tools implemented in the UK between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4.  The 
graphs below show that the macroprudential stance of Chile has been somewhat limited with 
the only adjustment to the policy stance occurring in the time around the GFC.  Figure 4 shows 
that the macroprudential policy stance in Colombia became more active in the time around the 
GFC and again in 2016.  The macroprudential policy stance in Japan has become more active 
in recent years and the same applies to Portugal.  Lastly, Figure 7 shows that the 
macroprudential policy stance became more active in the case of the UK in the period after the 
GFC while, the policy stance has once again been active since 2016.  
 
Figure 3 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Chile 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
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Figure 4 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Colombia 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 5 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Japan 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
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Figure 6 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Portugal 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 7 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in The 
United Kingdom 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
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4. Results 
4.1. Regression Results: Capital Conservation Buffer 
Table 3 shows the results o regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX (with 
country fixed effects).  Table 3 focuses on the capital conservation buffer and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient on the 
lagged credit growth is positive and statistically significant when considering the Latin 
American panel and the five country cases in both the first and the second regressions.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term between credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice 
index, in this case the capital conservation buffer, is positive and statistically significant when 
considering the Latin American panel however, the coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant in the case of Japan.  
 
Table 3 - Regression Results for Capital Conservation Buffer 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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4.2. Regression Results: Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
Table 4 shows the results of regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX (with 
country fixed effects).  Table 4 focuses on the countercyclical capital buffer and the value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient of the 
lagged value of credit growth is positive and statistically significant in all cases except that of 
the EU panel where the sign is positive however, not statistically significant for both 
regressions.  The coefficient on the macroprudential policy choice index is negative and 
statistically significant in the case of the UK for the first regression equation. 
 
Table 4 - Regression Results for Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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4.3. Regression Results: Limits on Loan-to-Value Ratios 
Table 5 shows the results of regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX (with 
country fixed effects).  Table 5 focuses on limits on loan-to-value ratios and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient on the 
lagged value of credit growth is once again both positive and statistically significant for all 
cases except that of the EU panel for both regression equations.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term between VIX and the macroprudential policy choice index, in this case limits 
on loan-to-value ratios is positive and statistically significant when considering the Latin 
American panel in the second regression equation, the coefficient on the macroprudential policy 
choice index is also positive and statistically significant in the second regression equation when 
considering the Latin American panel.  Finally, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice index is negative and statistically 
significant for the second regression equation for the Latin American panel.   
 
Table 5 - Regression Results for Limits on Loan-to-Value Ratios 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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4.4. Regression Results: Reserve Requirements 
Table 6 shows the results of regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX (with 
country fixed effects).  Table 6 focuses on reserve requirements and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient on lagged 
credit growth is once again positive and statistically significant in all cases except that of the 
EU panel for both regression equations.  The coefficient on the macroprudential policy choice 
index, in this case reserve requirements, is negative and statistically significant when 
considering the first regression equation for the case of Portugal. 
 
Table 6 - Regression Results for Reserve Requirements 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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4.5. Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices 
Table 7 shows the results of regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX (with 
country fixed effects).  Table 7 focuses on the sum of macroprudential policy choices and the 
value of the macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient 
on lagged credit growth is positive and statistically significant for all cases in the second 
regression and positive and statistically significant for all cases except that of the EU panel 
when considering the first regression equation.   
 
Table 7 - Regression Results for Sum of Macroprudential Policy Changes 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
 
The coefficient on the macroprudential policy choice index is negative and statistically 
significant for the case of Portugal when considering both the first regression equation as well 
as the second regression equation and the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for 
the case of the UK when considering the second regression equation.  The interaction term 
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between credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice index is positive and statistically 
significant for the case of Portugal in the second regression, the interaction term between VIX 
and the macroprudential policy choice index is also positive and statistically significant when 
considering the case of Portugal in the second regression equation. 
 
The results of a number of robustness checks5 are similar to those of the main results discussed, 
noticeably, the coefficient on the macroprudential policy choice index is negative and 
statistically significant for the EU panel for both regressions, where the correction for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation is not included, when considering reserve 
requirements.  The interaction term between credit and the macroprudential policy choice index 
is also negative and statistically significant in the second regression when considering reserve 
requirements for the EU panel, the same is true when considering the sum of macroprudential 
policy choices for the EU panel when the correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
is not included. 
 
The interaction term between credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice stance is 
negative in the majority of cases however, the regression results are only statistically significant 
in a small number of cases.  An inverse relationship between credit growth and the 
macroprudential policy choice index, as can be seen a negative coefficient on the interaction 
term between credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice index, would imply that 
higher levels of credit growth are associated with lower levels of the macroprudential policy 
choice index and hence, a looser macroprudential policy stance results in higher credit 
availability.  A tightening of the capital conservation buffer results in a decrease in the credit 
supply when looking at the case of Japan, in Latin America, a tightening of the capital 
conservation buffer results in an increase in the credit supply.  A tightening of the loan-to-value 
ratio results in a decrease in the credit supply in Latin America.  Lastly, a tightening in the 
overall macroprudential policy stance results in an increase in the credit supply in Portugal and 
a decrease in the credit supply in Japan.   
 
  
                                                
5 Regression results of robustness checks available on request. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the GFC, policy makers around the world came to the realization that 
traditional prudential policy frameworks with monetary policy as a prioritized policy tool 
lacked the scope to prevent financial crises and the financial turmoil that often accompanies 
these.  The US housing bubble had severe effects on both the US economy as well as the global 
economy and although, the Federal Reserve and other Central Banks were unable to contain 
the turmoil, macroprudential policy frameworks emerged with the aim of achieving both 
financial and economic security and stability going forward as well as ensuring that bubbles 
never again grow to the disproportionately dangerous levels experienced prior to the GFC. 
 
This paper studies the impact of macroprudential policy on financial stability for both an EU 
panel of 27 countries and a Latin American panel of 7 countries.  A case study looking at the 
cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK is also included.  A monthly index, 
iMaPP database constructed by Alam et al. (2019), of macroprudential policy tools 
implemented in the relevant countries is used as a starting point. This index is coded through 
2016:Q4, this index is then cross checked using the Cerutti et al. (2017) index and extended 
using the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey and the IMF Macroprudential Data Query report. 
The monthly index is cumulated to create the quarterly database used in this paper.  The 
extended and updated index is then used to study the effectiveness of macroprudential policy 
tools in controlling credit growth using a dynamic panel data model for the period between 
2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4. 
 
Our main results find that the impact of the cumulative macroprudential index of policy choices 
is not statistically significant when considering a panel of 27 EU countries, this result is in line 
with earlier literature that finds that the impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation 
is less significant when considering developed, open economies (Cerutti et al., 2017). An 
inverse relationship between credit growth and the macroprudential policy choice index, as can 
be seen a negative coefficient on the interaction term between credit growth and the 
macroprudential policy choice index, would imply that higher levels of credit growth are 
associated with lower levels of the macroprudential policy choice index and hence, a looser 
macroprudential policy stance results in higher credit availability.  A tightening of the capital 
conservation buffer results in a decrease in the credit supply when looking at the case of Japan.  
When looking at a panel of 7 Latin American countries, our main results show that a tightening 
of the capital conservation buffer results in an increase in the credit supply.  A tightening of the 
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loan-to-value ratio results in a decrease in the credit supply in the panel of 7 Latin American 
countries. The success of caps on loan-to-value ratios (LTV) is in line with previous literature, 
most recently Gambacorta and Murcia (2019) show that macroprudential policy tools aimed at 
controlling credit cycles are found to be effective at reducing credit growth, Claessens et al. 
(2013) find that debt-service-to-income ratio (DSTI) caps and LTV caps more effectively 
manage asset growth than capital requirements.  Lastly, a tightening in the overall 
macroprudential policy tool stance results in a decrease in credit supply in Japan and an increase 
in credit supply in Portugal.  In light of these results, policy makers should tighten both their 
overall macroprudential policy stance as well as their capital conservation buffers in Japan in 
times of financial stress and in an effort to curb surges in credit supply.  Policy makers should 
tighten their loan-to-value ratios in times of financial stress and credit abundance in Latin 
America however, in contrast, policy makers should loosen their capital conservation stance in 
times of credit abundance in an effort to stabilise credit supply.  Lastly, the overall 
macroprudential policy stance should be loosened in Portugal in times of financial instability. 
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Appendix A  
A.1. Variable Sources 
Table A1 - Sources of Variables  
 
 
A.2. Variable Definitions 
Table A2 - Definitions of Variables 
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A.3. Summary Statistics 
Table A3 - Summary Statistics for Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
 
 
Table A4 - Summary Statistics for the European Panel and the Latin American Panel 
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Appendix B 
B.1. Maddala and Wu Test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) for the Presence of Panel Unit 
Roots 
Table B1 - Results of Fisher Type Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: First generation Maddala and Wu Test for panel unit roots (Maddala and Wu, 1999) results based on: Ho: 
All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared (2) 
test are presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The 
presence of a unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on 
regression equations with sum of the macroprudential policy choices included as the index value. 
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B.2. First Generation Fisher Type Tests (Phillips–Perron Test) for the Presence of Panel 
Unit Roots 
Table B2 - Results of Fisher Type Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: First generation Fisher Type test for panel unit roots (Phillips–Perron test) results based on: Ho: All panels 
contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared (2) test are 
presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of a 
unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations 
with sum of the macroprudential policy choices included as the index value. 
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B.3. Second Generation Pesaran Test (Pesaran, 2007) for the Presence of Panel Unit 
Roots 
Table B3 - Results of Fisher Type Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: Second generation Pesaran test for panel unit roots (Pesaran, 2007) results based on: Ho: All panels 
contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared (2) test are 
presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of a 
unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations 
with sum of the macroprudential policy choices included as the index value. 
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B.4. Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin Watson Test for 
Autocorrelation: 
Table B4 - Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation 
 
Note: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No First-Order Autocorrelation and Ha: First 
Order Autocorrelation. The results of the F-test and the corresponding p-values are presented in the above table. 
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1. Durbin 
Watson test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No Autocorrelation and Ha: Positive Autocorrelation or 
Inconclusive Results. The Durbin Watson Test Statistic is quoted in the table above, the upper and lower Durbin 
Watson bounds from Savin and White at a 1% Confidence Interval are also quoted in the above table. Test 
Statistic values above the upper bound result in the null hypothesis not being rejected and hence, no positive 
serial correlation is present. A Test Statistic below the lower bound results in the assumption that positive serial 
correlation is present and a Test Statistic within the bounds results in an inconclusive result.  Statistical test results 
based on regression equations with sum of the macroprudential policy choices included as the index value. 
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B.5. Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: 
Table B5 - Results for Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity
 
Note: Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity results based on: Ho: No Heteroskedasticity present and Ha: 
Heteroskedasticity present. The results of a Chi-squared (1) test are presented in the above table with both the 
Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The absence of Heteroskedasticity is rejected for the cases 
where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations with sum of the macroprudential 
policy choices included as the index value. 
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Appendix C 
C.1. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
Instrumental Variables 
Table C1 shows the results of regressing credit growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of 
the macroprudential policy choice index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of VIX.  
Table C1 focuses on the sum of macroprudential policy choices and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  An instrumental variable 
(Regulatory Quality) is included to account for any measurement error, omitted variable bias 
or simultaneity bias that may occur due to the endogeneity of the macroprudential policy tool 
index. The coefficient on lagged credit growth is positive and statistically significant for the 
cases of the Latin American panel, Chile, Japan and Portugal in the second regression and 
positive and statistically significant for all the cases of the Latin American panel, Chile and 
Japan when considering the first regression equation.  The sign on the interaction term between 
credit growth and the macroprudential policy tool index is negative and statistically significant 
for the case of Japan.  This result is in line with the results in Table 7 where an instrumental 
variable is not included in the regression.  The sign on the credit growth remains positive 
throughout in both regressions when moving from a regression with no instrumental variable 
to a regression including an instrumental variable with the exception of Portugal in the first 
regression. 
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Table C1 - Regression Results for Sum of Macroprudential Policy Changes with 
Instrumental Variables 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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Appendix D 
D.1. Policy Instruments  
Table D1 - Summary of Various Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
 
Source: Alam et al. (2019) 
Note: * indicates that subcategories are available and included in the iMaPP Database. 
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D.2. iMaPP Database and Other Existing Databases 
Table D2 - Summary of Data Sources and Coverage of the iMaPP Database, constituting 
Databases as well as Other Macroprudential Databases 
 
Source: Alam et al. (2019) 
Note (As Defined by Alam et al. 2019):  
1.) The classification of instruments differs across databases. The column "Instruments" shows the number 
of categories, including subcategories, available in each dataset, without standardizing classification.  
2.)  "T/L indexes" is the dummy-type indexes for tightening and loosening actions of macroprudential 
policy measures.   
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